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ABSTRACT Data aggregation plays an important role in the Internet of Things, and its study and analysis has
resulted in a range of innovative services and benefits for people. However, the privacy issues associated with
raw sensory data raise significant concerns due to the sensitive nature of the user information it often contains.
Thus, numerous schemes have been proposed over the last few decades to preserve the privacy of users’
data. Most methods are based on encryption technology, which is computationally and communicationally
expensive. In addition, most methods can only handle a single aggregation function. Therefore, in this paper,
we propose a multifunctional data aggregation method with differential privacy. The method is based on
machine learning and can support a wide range of statistical aggregation functions, including additive and
non-additive aggregation. It operates within a fog computing architecture, which extends cloud computing
to the edge of the network, alleviating much of the computational burden on the cloud server. And, by only
reporting the results of the aggregation to the server, communication efficiency is improved. Extensive
experimental results show that the proposed method not only answers flexible aggregation queries that meet
diversified aggregation goals, but also produces aggregation results with high accuracy.
INDEX TERMS Data aggregation, differential privacy, fog computing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Data aggregation is considered to be an essential research
topic in the Internet of Things (IoT). For example, energy
companies collect and aggregate utility data from sensors
installed at customer sites, which is used to improve the
overall reliability and efficiency of their infrastructure [1].
Likewise, in traffic monitoring systems, traffic flow data
is collected by road-side sensors and used to analyze the
network to improve services for drivers [2]. In wireless body
area networks (WBANs), health data is collected through
mobile or wearable devices to monitor a user’s health indica-
tors, but aggregated data is needed for medical research [3].
Given the often sensitive nature of the data involved, pri-
vacy is an important issue in data aggregation. For instance,
health data, such as blood pressure and temperature, can
reveal a user’s health status, and electricity usage patterns can
be used to profile a customer’s lifestyle and daily routines [4].
For this reason, many people choose not to participate in
sensory systems without a strong guarantee of privacy.
Methods to preserve the privacy of aggregated data have
been developed by several scholars [5]–[9]. However, most
are based on encryption technology, such as homomorphic
encryption. For example, Dong et al.’s [10] data aggregation
method for smart grids is based on EIGamal-based homo-
morphic privacy preservation, while Abdallah and Shen ’s
scheme [11] introduces lightweight lattice-based homomor-
phic privacy preservation.
Despite these efforts, there are many problems with the
existing methods.
• Computation overhead. Homomorphic encryption typ-
ically results in massive computational overheads [1],
which increases the burden of processing and analysis
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on cloud services. Additionally, these methods are not
practical for sensors with limited energy.
• Communication efficiency. The communication over-
heads are high, especially when the system contains
thousands of sensors with high reporting frequency,
because each sensor needs to report its encrypted data
to the cloud at the same time.
• Single aggregation function calculation. Most exist-
ing methods can only calculate a single aggregation
function. In practice, the ideal aggregation scheme
would allow flexible aggregation queries to meet
diversified aggregation goals with only one round of
communication.
To solve these problems, we propose a privacy-preserving
data aggregation method based on machine learning within
a fog computing architecture. Fog computing architectures
distribute computation and data storage to the edge of the
network, i.e., to devices that sit between the data source and
the cloud server. This type of architecture reduces the amount
of data transported to the cloud, improving efficiency and
alleviating much of the burden on the server itself. Addition-
ally, in our method, the aggregator resides at the center of
the fog and only the aggregation results are reported to the
cloud server, which significantly increases communication
efficiency. Aggregation queries are answered by learning a
model, which is trained to predict the query results through
a process that satisfies differential privacy. Multiple aggrega-
tion functions can be calculated, including additive aggrega-
tion and non-additive aggregation. Finally, the method does
not apply encryption technology, so the sensors only need to
report raw data without the need for a complex cipher process.
In summary, this paper offers the following contributions.
• We propose a novel privacy-preserving data aggrega-
tion method under fog computing architecture, which
reduces the communication overhead and releases the
cloud burdens.
• The proposed privacy-preserving data aggregation
method is based on machine learning. The trained learn-
ing model can be used to predict the aggregation query
results and supports multiple aggregation functions,
which allows the server provides various services.
• The proposed data aggregation method satisfies differ-
ential privacy, which provides rigorous privacy protec-
tion for sensory data. Efficiently defend the differential
attack that appears in most aggregation functions.
• We theoretically analyse the privacy and utility of pro-
posed methods and extensive experimental results show
that the proposed method generates highly accurate
aggregated results.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we introduce the preliminaries. Section III proposes the
research problem. We present our privacy preservation
method and theoretically analyze its privacy and utility in
Sections IV and V, respectively. Section VI details the results
of the experiments. Section VII discusses the related work,
and Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. NOTATIONS
Let Sfc = {s1, s2, . . . , sg} be a group of sensors. These
sensors report the sensory data to the fog nodes f1 and f2.
The fog node trains a learning model M using the collected
data and predicts the query results. Let Q{q1, q2, . . . , qt } be
a set of queries which generated by the fog center. Additional
notations are shown in Table 1.
TABLE 1. Notations.
B. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
Differential privacy is a provable privacy notation, developed
by Dong et al. [12] that has emerged as an essential standard
for preserving privacy in a variety of areas.
Definition 1 (-Differential Privacy): A randomized algo-
rithmM gives -differential privacy for any pair of neighbor-
ing datasets D andD∗ where, for every set of outcomes,M
satisfies
Pr[M(D) ∈ ] ≤ exp() · Pr[M(D∗) ∈ ]. (1)
This definition ensures that the presence or absence of an
individual will not significantly affect the output of the query.
Definition 2 (Global Sensitivity): For a queryQ : D→ R,
the global sensitivity of Q is defined as follow:
GS = maxD,D′‖Q(D)− Q(D′)‖1 (2)
Definition 3 (Laplace Mechanism): Given a function f :
D→ R over a datasetD, Eq. 3 provides -differential privacy.
f̂ (D) = f (D)+ Laplace( s

). (3)
A Laplace mechanism is used to produce numeric output,
and differential privacy is achieved by adding Laplace noise
to the true answer.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. SYSTEM MODEL
As shown in Fig. 1, the system model is composed of four
entities: sensors, fog nodes, the fog center, and a cloud
server. A description of each entity follows.
• Sensors: The sensors, which might be embedded in
smart devices, collect the data. To address privacy con-
cerns, the original data is partitioned and separately
reported to two fixed fog nodes.
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FIGURE 1. The private multifunctional aggregation system model.
• Fog nodes: The fog nodes are efficient devices for
computing and storing data that extend the edge of the
cloud service. These devices serve as storage to answer
aggregation queries sent from the fog center.
• Fog center: The fog center is in charge of three impor-
tant tasks. First, it transfers queries to the appropriate
aggregation query set to be answered by the fog nodes.
Second, it gathers the returned query results from the fog
nodes. Third, it calculates the original query results and
reports them to the cloud server.
• Cloud server: The cloud server is managed by the ser-
vice provider and deployed as the aggregation applica-
tion. This server is powerful and is used to process and
analyze large amounts of aggregation data to provide
information and assist with a wide range of services.
B. ADVERSARY MODEL
In this paper, we assume that the cloud server and the fog
center are untrusted. Both will try to acquire the true values
of the collected data, which is either sensitive or could be used
to infer private information about the service users, or both.
The fog nodes are semi-trusted, which means they are curious
about the collected data but are not able to collude with each
other.
C. DESIGN OBJECTIVES
Our objective is to design an efficient data aggregation
method that preserves the privacy of the users’ data and
allows for multifunctional aggregation queries in an IoT set-
ting. Within this problem, there are three primary objectives:
• to ensure multifunctional aggregation is implemented
correctly. To suit practical requirements, the method
must include flexible aggregation functions to meet
diverse analysis requirements for a wide and diverse
range of services. Therefore, a mechanism that can sat-
isfy multifunctional aggregation requirements and flexi-
bly answer a range of data aggregation queries is highly
desirable.
• to guarantee the privacy of the collected user data.
Adversarial models consider possible privacy threats to
an individual’s privacy and, given that the data collected
often pertains to a user’s health or behavioral habits,
the aggregation scheme developed must satisfy each
individual’s privacy with a guarantee of -differential
privacy.
• to ensure the aggregation results are close to the results
without privacy protection. As the proposed system
needs to satisfy  - differential privacy, any noise added
to the training set will reduce the accuracy of the aggre-
gation results. (How accuracy is evaluated is defined in
Definition 4.) Hence, the method must include a way
to adjust the sensitivity and the amount of added noise
to ensure the accuracy of the aggregation results are
(α, β)-useful.
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME
In this paper, we propose a multifunctional aggregation
framework based on machine learning. In general, the data
collected from each region are used to train a learning model,
which, in turn, is used to predict multiple query results. The
predicted query results are then further processed to calculate
the required aggregation function. This framework is able to
deliver multifunctional aggregation in one round of commu-
nication without disclosing the sensory data to any party.
Fig. 2 illustrates the complete aggregation process. Within
the framework, two fog nodes are in charge of collecting data
from each region. Once a sensor collects some information,
it randomly partitions the data into two parts and separately
transmits one part to each of the two fog nodes. Because the
fog nodes cannot collude, neither node can integrate or infer
the true values of the sensor data. Each fog node receives
data from many sensors, and once assembled, the fog node
trains a learning model using the data it has received. Once
trained, the learning model is able to predict the summation
of any sensor’s value. To defend against differential attacks,
the training dataset is generated using a process that satisfies
differential privacy. The fog center fetches the query results
from the two fog nodes, calculates the aggregation results,
and returns those results to the cloud server.
A. DATA AGGREGATION PROTOCOL
This section presents the proposed privacy-preserving data
aggregation method. The method includes three stages: pro-
cessing the query, generating the sensor report, and predicting
the query results while preserving privacy.
1) QUERY PROCESSING
As previously mentioned, this method supports multiple
functions simultaneously. Allowable query functions aremin,
max, medium, σ -percentile, average, and summation aggre-
gation. The cloud server sends all these queries together to the
fog center. The fog center sends each newly generated query
set to a fog node to be answered, and the fog node returns the
results to the cloud server. In detail, the process is as follows:
• Step 1: Query set generation. The fog nodes can-
not answer min, max, medium, σ -percentile, and aver-
age queries directly, which means the fog center must
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FIGURE 2. Aggregation process.
TABLE 2. New query generation.
generate the proper queries first. To illustrate this pro-
cess, consider a min aggregation as an example. Assum-
ing the query q = min(s1, s3, s4) represents the min
value of sensors s1, s3 and s4, the fog center generates
three independent queries to determine the value of each
sensor, as shown in Table 2. The samemethod is used for
max, medium, and σ -percentile queries.
To calculate average queries, we simply sum the values
of the queried sensor.
• Calculating the original query results. Assume a query
set Q(q1, q2, . . . qn) is a newly generated query that
requires different aggregation functions, say, min, max,
medium, σ -percentile and average. The methods for
calculating the corresponding query results are shown
below:
– Min: minD = min{q1(D), q2(D), . . . qn(D)}
– Max: maxD = max{q1(D), q2(D), . . . qn(D)}
– Medium: If n is odd, medD = qi(D), where{
|[min, qi(D)| ≥ (n+ 1)/2
|[qi(D),max|) ≥ (n+ 1)/2
If n is even, medD = (qi(D)+ qj(D))/2, where
|[min, qi(D)]| ≥ n/2
|[qi(D),max]| ≥ n/2+ 1
|[min, qj(D)]| ≥ n/2+ 1
|[qj(D),max]| ≥ n/2
– σ -percentile: perD = qi(D), where{
|[min, qi(D)]| ≥ bσn/100c
|[qi(D),max]| ≥ b(100− σ )n/100c
– Average: aveD =
∑
qi(D)
n
– Summation: sumD =∑ni=1 qi(D)
In the above,min,max,medium, σ -percentile, and average
of a dataset D are denoted as minD, maxD, medD, perD, and
aveD, respectively. |[a, b]| refers to the number of values that
fall within the range [a, b]. Once calculated, the fog center
sends the aggregation results back to the cloud server for
further processing.
2) SENSOR REPORT GENERATION
Assume that the sensors report their sensory data to the fog
nodes every 15 minutes. And to provide the required range of
services, they must report their data simultaneously. To avoid
disclosing any real information to the fog nodes, a simple
algorithm that resides on the sensor device partitions the data
before it is sent. Specifically, each sensor si ∈ Sfc gathers
sensory data m at time point tγ and carries out the following
protocol:
• Step 1: A random number κ ∈ 0 m is generated for the
current time point tγ .
• Step 2: The sensor reports κ to the fog node f1 through
a wireless network.
• Step 3: The sensor calculates the value of ι and reports
it to the fog node f2, where ι = m− κ .
3) PREDICTING THE QUERY RESULTS WHILE
PRESERVING PRIVACY
After receiving all the reported data from the sensors, the fog
node predicts the query results according to the following
steps:
• Step 1: Generate a training set.
The fog node generates a query set QS with ν queries.
Each query includes Sfc features, which are the features
17122 VOLUME 6, 2018
M. Yang et al.: Machine Learning Differential Privacy With Multifunctional Aggregation in a Fog Computing Architecture
of the sensory data. Sensitivity needs to be considered
during the process of generating the training set because,
without proper calibration, substantial errors can occur.
Query sensitivity is defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Query Sensitivity): Given a group of
queries Q(q1, q2, . . . , qν) over a data set D, the query
sensitivity SQ is defined as follow:
SQ = max
ν∑
i=1
sign(| qi(D)− qi(D′) |), (4)
where D′ is the neighbouring dataset of D.
Query sensitivity evaluates how many queries results
are affected by a single record. To reduce the query
sensitivity, the feature being queried is controlled within
Smax times in each query set, where Smax ≤ ν.
To ensure the model satisfies differential privacy and
can defend against differential attacks, Laplace noise
is added to the query results. Specifically, the noisy
answer QˆA = QA + {Lap(Smax/),Lap(Smax/), . . . ,
Lap(Smax/)}, where QA represents the vector of the
query results.
• Step 2: Training the learning model.
The training set generated in the last step < Q, QˆA > is
used to train the learning model. Given the sensory data
is made up of numerical values, the model M could be
trained using a variety of regression algorithms. In this
paper, we used a simple linear regression algorithm that
demonstrated good performance during the experiments.
• Step 3: Predicting the query results.
The trained model is then used to predict the results of
fresh queries Q sent by fog center. Specifically, ˆQ(D) =
MQ, ˆQ(D) is the noisy answers of queries.
In summary, the proposed method addresses the three chal-
lenges mentioned in Section I - computation overheads, com-
munication overheads, and multifunctional aggregation. The
lack of required encryption technology ameliorates the com-
putation overhead, and introducing a machine learning pro-
cess coupled with a fog architecture allows for more powerful
computing power and greater storage capabilities. As such,
the sensor nodes only need to report raw, unprocessed data,
and the fog center distributes tasks to a number of fog nodes,
which reduces the burden on the cloud server. Communica-
tion efficiency is improved by only reporting the aggregation
results to the cloud server rather than all the sensory data. And
the last section demonstrates the power of multifunctional
aggregation within the proposed protocol.
V. PRIVACY AND UTILITY
In this section, we theoretically analyze the privacy and utility
of our method.
A. PRIVACY ANALYSIS
In the proposed method, generating the training set is the only
process that consumes the privacy budget. Theorem 1 shows
that the proposed data release method satisfies -differential
privacy.
Theorem 1: Each record in a given datasetD represents the
sensory data of one sensor, and each record is independent of
the others. Thus, the proposed privacy-preserving aggrega-
tion method can provide  - differential privacy.
Proof: LetQ be a set of training queries. Laplace noise is
added to the query results, generating a noisy answer ˆQ(D) =
Q(D) + Laplace(smax/). Throughout the entire process,
the original dataset D can only be accessed by the training
queries. The process for training the model is based on the
training dataset, whereas the prediction process is based on
the trained learning model. These processes do not consume
any of the privacy budget and cannot disclose any private
information because the original dataset is not interrogated.
Therefore, every aspect of this aggregation method satisfies
-differential privacy. Additionally, the original sensory data
is divided into two parts and reported separately to the two fog
nodes. Each fog node conducts its protocols independently.
Hence, each fog node also satisfies -differential privacy.
In the analysis below, we examine the composite property
of the privacy budget for the entire dataset to determine the
privacy guarantee is satisfied.
Theorem 2 (Parallel Composition [13]): Assumewe have
a set of privacymechanismsM = {M1,M2, . . . ,Mm}, and
eachM〉 provides i privacy guarantee on a disjoint subset of
the entire dataset, M provides max(i) - differential privacy.
Theorem. 2 directly illustrates the privacy guarantee in the
proposed method. The sensory data is sliced into two parts;
therefore, the data received by the fog nodes are disjoint and
independent of each other. According to Theorem. 2, the set
of privacy mechanisms {M1,M2, . . . ,Mm} will consume
themax{1, 2, . . . , m} of the privacy budget. In our method,
each fog node is assigned the same privacy budget; therefore,
the proposed method preserves differential privacy. 
B. UTILITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we apply a well-known utility definition sug-
gested by Abdallah and Shen [14] to measure the accuracy of
the proposed privacy framework.
Definition 4 ((α, β)-Useful): A mechanism M is
(α, β)-useful with respect to a set of queries, if for every data
set D, with a probability of at least 1 − β, the output of the
mechanismM satisfies
Pr[max| ˆM(celli)−M(celli)| ≤ α] ≥ 1− β. (5)
Based on the definition of accuracy (Definition 4), we
demonstrate that a certain value of α bounds the errors caused
by our method with a high probability.
Theorem 3: The output errors of a set of the queries on
collected data caused by the proposed method is bounded
by α with a probability of at least 1 − β. The pro-
posed method is satisfied with (α, β)-usefulness when α <
max{
√
4sln 2|H |
β
m ,
√
n2ln |H |
β
m }.
Proof: The errors caused by the proposed method occur
when noise is added to the training set and when training the
model. Suppose the chosen learning algorithm for the model
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has a hypothesis set H = {h1, h2, . . . , hi} of size |H |. The
error probability is denoted as follows:
Pr[error] ≤ Pr[errorn]+ Pr[errorm], (6)
where errorn refers to the errors caused by adding noise, and
errorm refers to the errors caused by training model.
To satisfy differential privacy, Laplace noise is added to the
entire training set. The level of error can be calculated using
the properties of Laplace noise, presented as sums of Laplace
random variables, as shown in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 (Sums of Laplace Random Variables [15]): Let
λ1, λ2, . . . , λm be a set of independent random variables
drawn from Laplace(σ ). Then for every α > 0,
Pr(|
∑
λi
m
| > α) = exp(−mα
2
4σ
). (7)
As errorn =
∑
i | ˆfi(D)−fi(D)|
m , we have Pr[errorn > α] =
Pr[
∑
i | ˆfi(D)−fi(D)|
m < α]. For each fi, the number of errors are
equal to the random variable λi sampled from Laplace( s ).
Therefore, Pr[errorn > α] = Pr(|
∑
λi
m | > α). According to
the Lemma 1,
Pr[errorn > α] = exp(−mα
2
4σ
) = exp(−mα
2
4s
) (8)
For all hypotheses h ∈ H , we then have
Pr[errorn > α] = |H |exp(−mα
2
4s
). (9)
Let β = 2|H |exp(−mα24s ), we have α =
√
4sln 2|H |
β
m .
The error errorm can be analyzed with the help of the
Chernoff_Hoeffding bound [15], shown as follow.
Lemma 2 (Real-Valued Chernoff-Hoeffding Bound [15]):
Let X1, . . . ,Xm be independent random variables with
E[Xi] = u and a ≤ Xi ≤ b for all i, then for every α > 0,
Pr(|
∑
i Xi
m
| > α) ≤ 2exp( −2α
2m
(b− a)2 ). (10)
All queries to train the model are range queries. If the
dataset has n records and each value is 1, the output of
the query range from 0 to n. As errorm =
∑
i |fi(D)−fi(M )|
m ,
Pr[errorm > α] = Pr[
∑
i |fi(D)−fi(M )|
m ) > α]. According to
Lemma 2, for each hypothesis h ∈ H , we have Pr[errorm >
α] = Pr[
∑
i |fi(D)−fi(M )|
m ) > α] ≤ 2exp(−2α
2 m
n2
). Thus, for all
hypothesis, we then have
Pr[errorm > α] ≤ 2|H |exp(−2α
2m
n2
). (11)
Let β = 2× 2|H |exp(−2α2 m
n2
), we have α =
√
n2ln |H |
β
m .
Therefore,
Pr[error > α] ≤ Pr[errorn > α]+ Pr[errorm > α]]
≤ |H |exp(−mα
2
4s
)+ 2|H |exp(−2α
2m
n2
)
(12)
Let β = |H |exp(−mα24s ) + 2|H |exp(−2α
2 m
n2
), we get
that when α < max{
√
4sln 2|H |
β
m ,
√
n2ln |H |
β
m }, the accu-
racy of proposed method satisfies the (α, β) − useful
definition. In other worlds, the error is controlled by
α = max{
√
4sln 2|H |
β
m ,
√
n2ln |H |
β
m } with a probability of at
least 1− β.

VI. EXPERIMENT EVALUATION
A. EXPERIMENT SETUP
1) DATASET
We used two real-world datasets to evaluate the performance
of our method. The Reference Energy Disaggregation Data
Set (REDD) contains specific information about the electric-
ity consumption of many real homes over several months.
MHEALTH [16] is a mobile health dataset, which contains
more than 1 million records, each comprising the data from
24 different sensor signals. Given each signal is at the same
scale, we randomly chose one type of signal for evaluation.
2) METRICS
We used the mean absolute error (MAE) to evaluate the
accuracy of the results, defined as follows:
MAE = 1
m
∑
Qi∈Q
| ˆQi(D)− Qi(D)|, (13)
where Qi(D) is the true aggregation result for one query,
and ˆQ(D) is the perturbed aggregation result that calculated
through our aggregation framework. A lowerMAE represents
a higher accuracy.
3) COMPARISON
Within our proposed aggregation framework, multifunctional
aggregation could be achieved very simply using a traditional
Laplace differential privacy method (LapDP). The fog node
could be used as regional storage and to release the query
results used in the aggregation function calculations. Hence,
we compared our machine learning-based method (MLDP)
to the traditional LapDP method.
TABLE 3. Parameters.
4) PARAMETERS
Table 3 lists the parameter settings for our experiment.
B. EXPERIMENT RESULTS
To compare the performance of the proposed method with
LapDP, we assessed the results of several aggregation
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FIGURE 3. Performance with different sizes of query set. (a)–(f) REDD. (g)–(l) MHEALTH.
functions - sum,max,min, σ -percentile and average - in terms
MAE with a number of different conditions. These were:
1) PERFORMANCE BY VARYING SIZE OF QUERY SET
Varying size of query set: The query set is used to cal-
culate all aggregation functions. This experiment exam-
ined the performance of the proposed method on both the
REDD and MHEALTH datasets with query sets Qs ranging
from 1 to 500.
Fig. 3 shows the impact of the size of the query set on
the performance of both methods in terms of MAE. With
all aggregation functions on all the datasets, LapDP’s MAE
linearly increased as the size of query set grew, while MLDP
remained stable. This is because, given a fixed privacy bud-
get, the sensitivity in LapDP increases linearly with the
growth of query set and, in turn, the amount of noise added
to the query result also increases linearly. However, because
MLDP satisfies differential privacy during the training pro-
cess, the size of the query set has no effect on performance
with a fixed privacy budget.
We also observed that LapDP showed better performance
than MLDP with a small enough query set. But MLDP sig-
nificantly outperformed LapDP as the size of the query set
grew. For example, Fig. 3h shows the performance results for
themax function on the REDD dataset. At aQs < 20, MLDP
has a higher MAE than LapDP, whereas atQs > 20, MLDP’s
MAE is lower than LapDP. Similarly, Fig. 3d shows MLDP
with a higher MAE than LapDP up to Qs ≈ 18, at which
point it starts to perform better than LapDP. We find the
same results for other aggregation functions on both REDD
(Figs. 3g-3f) and the MHEALTH dataset (Figs. 4g-4l). For
example, LapDP performed 50% better than MLDP with
the min function on the MHEALTH dataset, with an MAE
of 42.2 compared to MLDP’s 94.1 at Qs = 5. However,
at Qs = 14, LapDP and MLDP show similar performance,
with an MAE of 96.4 and 94.3, respectively, and at Qs > 20,
MLDP significantly outperforms LapDP. These results indi-
cate that MLDP performs well, and significantly outperforms
the traditional Laplacemethod, when calculating aggregation
functions on large datasets.
2) VARYING THE LEVELS OF PRIVACY BUDGET
The privacy budget determines the amount of noise that is
added to the training set and the query results. To determine
how the privacy budget contributes to the final aggregation
results, we changed the budget from 0.1 to 1 in steps of 0.1 for
both datasets and fixed the training and query sets.
Fig. 4 shows the variations in the tendencies of all aggre-
gation functions for the REDD and MHEALTH datasets
along with the privacy budget . We observe that the MAE
decreased as the privacy budget  increased with both MLDP
and LapDP. This is because a smaller privacy budget  means
more noise needs to be added. Correspondingly, as the privacy
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FIGURE 4. Performance with different privacy budgets. (a)–(f) REDD. (g)–(l) MHEALTH.
budget increases, less noise needs to be added, which means
the results are less perturbed, leading to higher accuracy and
a smaller MAE. In addition, we observed that our method
consistently outperformed LapDP, with a lower MAE for all
aggregation functions. As shown in Figs. 4b and 4c, when
 = 0.2, LapDP scored an MAE of 1156 and 2941 for the
max and min functions, respectively, while MLDP scored
47.61 and 48.17 - a significant improvement. When  = 0.8,
LapDP resulted in an MAE of 236 for the max function
and 667 for the min function, which is much larger than the
MAE values of 34.24 and 60.00 for our method. We observed
similar results for the other aggregation functions, as shown
in Figs. 4a, 4d, 4e, and 4f. In addition, we observed that vary-
ing the privacy budget had a tremendous impact on LapDP’s
performance, while MLDP only showed small changes in
performance. For example, in Fig. 4e, when  = 1, LapDP’s
MAE was 190 for average aggregation, yet at  = 0.1,
LapDP’s MAE rose to 1781 - an increase of around 90%.
In contrast, MLDP’s MAE rose from 171 to 180 - an increase
of only around 6%. Figs. 4g - 4l show the results for the
MHEALTH dataset with similar observations. In Fig. 4g,
the sum aggregation at  = 0.2 resulted in an MAE of
around 200 for MLDP, outperforming LapDP by about 80%
at 1000. But at  = 0.5, LapDP’s MAE reduced dramatically
to 352; however, MLDP’s MAE was around 184, still per-
forming better than LapDP. Fig. 4l shows the results for the
σ -percentile aggregation. Here, MLDP consistently per-
formed better than LapDP, and the MAE changed rapidly as
the privacy budget increased.
This is because LapDP has a much higher sensitivity than
MLDP to begin with, which means it adds much more noise
to the original data. Hence, when the privacy budget is halved,
the amount of noise doubles. In LapDP’s case, this doubling
results in a huge amount of noise which significantly impacts
accuracy, while for MLDP, doubling the small level of initial
noise does not result in nearly as great a drop in accuracy.
3) PERFORMANCE BY VARYING SIZE OF TRAINING SET
Our theoretical analysis indicated that the size of the training
set would play a vital role in the accuracy of the aggregation
result. To observe the change in performance with different
sized training sets, we increased the number of instances from
1 to 500 and tested all the aggregation functions using MLDP
on both datasets. We then compared the results to the MAEs
for the LapDP method with both a fixed privacy budget and
fixed query set size.
Fig. 5 shows the results for the REDD and MHEALTH
datasets, illustrating that the performance of the proposed
method is greatly improved by increasing the size of the
training set, initially, but once the training set reaches a
certain value, the MAE reaches its nadir and become stable.
As shown in Fig. 5e, the MAE continues to decrease until
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FIGURE 5. Performance with different sizes of training set. (a)–(f) REDD. (g)–(l) MHEALTH.
the training set contains 120 record where, at MAE = 4.0,
theMAE reaches its lowest point. Subsequent increases in the
size of the training set result in an MAE that fluctuates
around 4. Fig. 5f shows the results for the σ - percentile
aggregation. When the size of the training set is below 100,
theMAE is very high but decreases significantly as the size of
the training set increases, but at T > 150, the MAE no longer
decreases. Similar results were observed on the MHEALTH
dataset, as shown in Figs. 5g - 5l.
Given MLDP’s performance is impacted by a mixture of
noise and model errors, when the size of the training set is
small, the sensitivity and noise levels are small, so the model
errors play a more dominant role. Hence, the MAE decreases
significantly with an increase in the size of the training set.
However, beyond a certain threshold, a large training set
carries too much sensitivity and noise to offset the increase in
accuracy size brings. At this point, noise reduces the utility
of the model and the MAE stops decreasing.
VII. RELATED WORK
Existing data aggregation methods typically use homo-
morphic encryption when aggregating data to ensure
privacy [3], [17]–[21]. Zhang et al. [17] proposed a solution
based on peer-to-peer protocols, called VPA, to preserve pri-
vacy in people-centric urban sensing systems. VPA supports
a wide range of statistical additive and non-additive aggre-
gations, but cannot defend against the differential attacks
common to most data aggregation scenarios. Zhang et al. [19]
proposed a priority-based aggregation solution for health
data (PHDA), which includes privacy protection and also
improves the cloud aggregation efficiency of the cloud ser-
vice and the privacy of data privacy in WBANs. PHDA uses
the relationships between its users and fixed social spots to
choose the best relay for providing reliable data aggrega-
tion. In addition, PHDA can also withstand both internal and
external forgery attacks, but it does not handle differential
attack very well. Li et al. [21] proposed an efficient privacy-
preserving protocol, called EPADA, which calculates sum
aggregations from time-series data. The protocol uses addi-
tive homomorphic encryption and a novel key management
technique to support a large plain-text space. Although the
proposed method is easily extendable to min aggregations
with just one round of communication, it is more difficult
to adapt to compute multifunctional aggregations, especially
non-additive aggregate functions, such as percentile and aver-
age. Han et al. [3] proposed a privacy-preserving multifunc-
tional aggregation mechanism, also for health data. The cloud
server is able to calculate multiple statistical functions and
provides a range of services, each with privacy protection.
This method supports both additive and non-additive aggre-
gation functions.
However, all these schemes using encryption technol-
ogy to protect the user’s data and, since encryption usually
results in a significant computational overhead, they are not
practical for use with energy-limited sensors like smart-
phones. In addition, the computational burden on the cloud
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server is heavy, especially when aggregating data that is
reported with high frequency. A fog computing architec-
ture allows computing services to reside at the edge of the
network. Hence, a local aggregation device can be used to
calculate the query results, which reduces the communica-
tion and computation overheads on the cloud server. Several
papers have already explored privacy problems related to
data aggregation in fog computing [22]–[25]. For example,
Huang et al. [22] proposed a model that filters multiple
encrypted XML streams and performs aggregation operations
without decryption in a fog node. Lu et al. [25] proposed a
lightweight privacy-preserving data aggregation scheme for
fog computing-enhanced IoT devices. However, most also
include homomorphic encryption schemes, which does not
solve the problem of sensors with limited energy resources.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a privacy-preserving multifunc-
tional data aggregation method based on machine learning.
Within the method, a training dataset comprising the aggre-
gation queries is used to train a machine learning model,
which in turn predicts the aggregation results. The method
allows for multiple aggregation functions without disclosing
a user’s privacy. The framework operates within a fog com-
puting architecture, which means the computationally heavy
aggregation tasks are distributed to the edge of the network,
alleviating this burden from the cloud server. Additionally,
only the aggregation results are sent to the server rather
than all the sensory data, which significantly improves com-
munication efficiency. Experimental results prove that the
proposed method answers various aggregation queries with
high accuracy.
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